lundi 1 mars 2010

Bill Gross : Don't Care

Bill Gross de Pimco dont il est question dans un autre post, sort justement son "Investment Outlook" de mars aujourd'hui. Et décidément, c'est un financier beaucoup moins idiot que ses confrères :

Don't Care
Pimco Investment Outlook, Bill Gross, 01/03/2010 (traduire en Français texte en anglais )
http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/IO/2010/Investment+Outlook+March+2010+Bill+Gross+Dont+Care.htm
To begin with, let’s get reacquainted with the fundamental economic problem of our age – lack of global aggregate demand – and how we got to where we are today: (1) Twenty years of accelerated globalization incrementally undermined the real incomes of most developed countries’ workers/citizens, forcing governments to promote leverage and asset price appreciation in order to fill in what is known as an “aggregate demand” gap – making sure that consumers keep buying things. When the private sector assumed too much debt and asset prices bubbled (think subprimes and houses, or dotcoms/NASDAQ 5000), American-style capitalism with its leverage, deregulation, and religious belief in lower and lower taxes reached a dead end.

En bref, il explique très clairement en termes d'investisseurs, que les riches ne payent pas assez d'impôts et que ça a engendré surendettement et sous consommation mondiale chronique, faute de revenus.

Mais sinon, rien à voir avec 1929    On vous l'a bien dit à la télévision ! Alors ça suffit maintenant ! Vous gobez ce que la propagande vous dit de gober ! Non mais   

The cancellation of credit cards led to the Great Recession and private sector deleveraging, the beginning of government policy reregulation, and gradual deglobalization – a reversal of over 20 years of trade policies and free market orthodoxy. In order to get us out of the sinkhole and avoid another Great Depression, the visible fist of government stepped in to replace the invisible hand of Adam Smith. Short-term interest rates headed to 0% and monetary policies of central banks incorporated new measures labeled “quantitative easing,” which essentially involved the writing of trillions of dollars of checks to replace the trillions of dollars of credit that disappeared after Lehman Brothers. In addition, government fiscal policies, in combination with declining revenues, led to double-digit deficits as a percentage of GDP in many countries, a condition unheard of since the Great Depression.

Solution à la japonaise inside, où l'Etat prend le relais du secteur privé et maintient la dette totale pour empêcher la quantité de monnaie de s'effondrer, et maintenir ainsi le PIB.

Sauf que...

Et si les Etats ne pouvaient pas physiquement faire comme le Japon il y a 20 ans (qui disposait d'un fort taux d'épargne à 15% quand les américains peinent à atteindre les 5%, où le reste du monde riche était en pleine montée de sa bulle de crédit, et où le Japon pouvait massivement exporter) :

But what if they didn’t? What if, as Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have pointed out in their book, “This Time is Different,” our modern era was similar to history over the past several centuries when financial crises led to sovereign defaults or at least uncomfortable economic growth environments where real GDP was subpar based on onerous debt levels – sovereign and private market alike. What if – to put it simply – you couldn’t get out of a debt crisis by creating more debt?

Government bailouts and guarantees such as those evidenced and envisioned in Dubai and Greece, as well as those for the last 18 months with banks and large industrial corporations across the globe, suggest a more homogeneous “unicredit” type of bond market. If core sovereigns such as the U.S., Germany, U.K., and Japan “absorb” more and more credit risk, then the credit spreads and yields of these sovereigns should look more and more like the markets that they guarantee. The Kings, in other words, in the process of increasingly shedding their clothes, begin to look more and more like their subjects. Kings and serfs begin to share the same castle.

Si les Etats garantissent tous les risques de la finance privée, alors la dette des Etats va devoir supporter le même taux que le privé.

A deficiency of global aggregate demand and the potential impotency of policymakers to close the gap are evolving into a life or death outcome for the weakest sovereigns, with consequences for credit and asset markets worldwide.

Dommage qu'il ne donne pas son opinion sur la manière de combler le gouffre ("close the gap"). Je serais curieux de savoir de quel bord il est  


Mais bon, derrière le blabla, ça reste des financiers :

Pimco Rejected by Court on Market-Manipulation Suit
Bloomberg, Greg Stohr, 22/02/2010 (traduire en Français texte en anglais )
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20602007&sid=a_9SNNWeBunY
lawsuit seeking more than $600 million for the company’s alleged manipulation of the price of Treasury futures contracts on the Chicago Board of Trade.

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